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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCING THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction 
Regarded as the “jewel of Africa” as well as the “breadbasket of Africa” in the 1980s, 
Zimbabwe has become a “begging basket” in recent years.1 With the Zimbabwean economy 
languishing in depression, corruption has become an accepted and almost expected way of 
life, particularly in the public sector. Political and bureaucratic corruption has strained the 
economy of Zimbabwe as both senior and junior public officers resort routinely to corrupt 
activities.2 Corruption by public officers has become ubiquitous, a condition summed up by 
the conviction of the head of the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission, a former high-
ranking police officer, last year of corruption.3 Public officers are known for abusing their 
offices to acquire assets unlawfully and for receiving bribes to provide better services.4 
The absence of an assets declaration regime for public officers in Zimbabwe has 
facilitated looting with impunity. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the need for 
disclosure of assets by public officers in Zimbabwe. In doing so, it will deal also with the 
main elements of an assets declaration regime and how to ensure that the declaration 
measures are effective. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Zimbabwe is regarded as one of the most corrupt countries on the African continent. In 
2015, Transparency International ranked Zimbabwe number 150 out of 168 countries, with 
first place signifying the least corrupt and 168th place the most corrupt.5 On a scale of 0 
(highly corrupt) to 100 (least corrupt) for public sector corruption, Zimbabwe scored 21, 
which has been its score since 2013.6 Any score below 50 on the Corruption Perceptions 
Index indicates serious levels of public sector corruption, and a score of 21 clearly shows 
how widespread corruption is perceived to in Zimbabwe. During a survey in 2013 by 
                                                          
1 Willems (2005) 100. 
2 Goredema (2003) 27. 
3 Nemukuyu (2015). 
4 Tizora (2009) 10. 
5 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2015). 
6 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2013) & Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index (2015). 
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Transparency International in Zimbabwe, 70% of the participants viewed the public sector as 
extremely corrupt, with 86% identifying the police as most corrupt, 69% the judiciary and 
69% parliament.7 Clearly the public views public officers as considerably more corrupt than 
people in the private sector. 
Earlier this year, it was revealed that Zimbabwe lost US$15 billion in the diamond 
sector through corruption.8 For a country with a small economy, with a national budget of 
US$4 billion for 2016,9 and which has been unable to pay a huge US$7 billion debt since 
2000,10 this loss showed how corruption in the public sector continues to injure an already 
crippled economy. In other words, the amount lost to corruption was sufficient to revive the 
economy of Zimbabwe, but, as always, corruption heavily affects the poorest sections of 
society who bear the cost of the distortions it produces.11 
Corruption in the Zimbabwean public sector has been aggravated by the lack of 
preventive and accountability mechanisms, not least the lack of assets declaration laws. 
Most of the time, the extent of the asset holdings of public officers become known only 
when they are going through a nasty divorce or some other civil law suit, or when they 
simply brag about how rich they are. In 2010, the country was shocked when the wife of 
Doctor Ignatius Chombo, the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban 
Development, claimed that she and her husband owned close to a hundred houses and 
business stands in Zimbabwe, 12 investment companies, more than 3000 hectares of farm 
land, 15 vehicles, various assets in South Africa, and mines, farms and safari lodges in 
Zimbabwe.12 The Minister did not earn much money in the 1980s, before holding public 
office, and his is a good example of how public officers in Zimbabwe are exploiting the 
absence of assets declaration laws to loot the public purse and get away with it. 
Another senior public officer, Obert Mpofu, who mysteriously owns thousands of 
hectares of land in Zimbabwe, bought a bank for more than US$20 million and went on a 
real estate “shopping spree” when he was the Minister of Mines. It has been alleged that 
                                                          
7 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (2013). 
8 Magaisa (2016). 
9 Majaka (2015). 
10 Muvundusi (2014). 
11 Doig & Theobald (2003) 1. 
12 Matambanadzo (2010). 
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during his tenure there was mass looting of resources, especially in the diamond sector.13 
After he was removed from the post, he received a financial windfall, including the closure 
of the bank he had bought,14 leading to many questions being asked about the legitimacy of 
his fortunes. However, there was no chance of remedial action because no official record of 
his assets ever existed. 
1.3 Zimbabwe’s Current Position on Assets Declarations 
In 1985, the parliament of Zimbabwe enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act in a bid to 
fight corruption which had already started infiltrating the newly independent country.15 The 
Act provides for the prevention of corruption and the investigation of claims arising from 
dishonesty or corruption.16 The Act is still the main legislative source of anti-corruption law 
in Zimbabwe. However, it has been criticised as being quite inadequate and for having many 
loopholes that have made it possible for corruption to thrive.17 The Act does not provide in 
any way for assets declarations by public officers and this omission may be regarded as one 
of its chief inadequacies. Public officers have taken advantage of this loophole to amass 
resources, with no questions asked. 
In 2004, the Anti-Corruption Commission Act (ACCA) was enacted,18 which 
established the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission comprising members appointed by 
the President. The Anti-Corruption Commission has a mandate to fight corruption and 
makes recommendations to the government and to organisations on measures in this 
regard.19 In terms of the Act, the members of the Commission, together with their spouses, 
are required to disclose to the President their assets as well as every occupation, service or 
employment in which they are involved and from which they receive any remuneration.20 
However, the Commission has been conspicuously ineffective, and also has been implicated 
                                                          
13 Martin & Taylor (2012) 25. 
14 Munyoro (2015). 
15 Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 9: 16). 
16 Long Title of the Act. 
17 Goredema (2003) 27. 
18 Anti-Corruption Commission Act (Chapter 9: 22). 
19 Article 12 of ACCA. 
20 Article 8(1) of ACCA. 
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itself in corrupt activities several times. Recently four managers of the Commission were 
suspended for alleged corruption.21 
In 2007, Zimbabwe ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption.22 The 
Convention obligates States Parties to establish measures and systems requiring public 
officers to declare their assets, employment, investments and substantial gifts or benefits 
from which a conflict of interests may result with respect to their functions as public 
officers.23 Nine years later, Zimbabwe has not yet established any assets declarations 
measures, which failure has aggravated corruption by public officers. Article 20 of UNCAC 
provides that States Parties shall consider establishing, as a criminal offence, any significant 
increase in the assets of a public officer that he or she cannot explain reasonably in relation 
to his or her lawful income. For this provision to be satisfied there is a need for a legislative 
enactment to obligate public officers to declare their assets. 
Zimbabwe has ratified also the SADC Protocol against Corruption, which reaffirms 
the need to eliminate corruption by States Parties through the adoption of effective 
preventive and deterrent measures and through the strict enforcement of legislation to 
eliminate all types of corruption.24 Article 4(1)(a) of the Protocol provides that States Parties 
must create standards of conduct for the correct, honourable and proper fulfilment of 
public functions, as well as mechanisms to enforce these standards. 
Zimbabwe is also a member of the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption. Article 7 of the Convention, stipulates that States Parties must 
require either all public officers or designated public officers to declare their assets at the 
time of assumption of office and after their term of office in the public service has ended. 
Section 198 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 20 of 2013 requires 
the enactment of national legislation regulating disclosure of assets by public officers and 
establishing codes of conduct to be observed by public officers. It also requires that there 
should be measures specifying the standards of good corporate governance to be observed 
by government bodies and other state-controlled commercial entities. This constitutional 
                                                          
21 Maodza (2016). 
22 United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003), hereinafter referred to as UNCAC. 
23 Article 8(5) of UNCAC. 
24 Preamble to the SADC Protocol against Corruption (2001). 
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obligation has not been implemented yet, as there is no assets declaration regime in place 
in the country. 
Earlier this year, the Zimbabwe Parliament’s Standing Rules and Orders Committee 
approved a draft Assets Declaration Register that is intended to require parliamentarians, 
together with cabinet members, to declare their assets in terms of the Constitution and of 
the House’s Standing Rules and Orders.25 According to the draft, all immovable assets must 
be declared, and such declaration must disclose the address and the country in which the 
asset is located, its year of purchase, the percentage of the asset owned and names of any 
co-owners.26 
Movable properties that are subject to registration by law, such as cars, must be 
declared also, along with information encompassing a brief description of the asset, its 
location, year of acquisition and estimated value.27 Other movable property, such as 
precious stones, jewellery, and coins valued in excess of US$25 000 are to be declared, 
together with movable assets valued in excess of US$15 000 and real estate alienated in the 
past 12 months. In addition, bank accounts, deposits, investment funds, any other savings 
systems and any debts and liabilities above US$25 000 will have to be declared.28 Part V of 
Annex 1 to the draft Assets Declaration Register provides that any gifts, services or 
advantages free of charge or subject to subsidies as compared to the market value received 
from persons, organisations, companies, autonomous administrations, national companies 
or foreign public institutions and worth more than US$4 500 must be declared, recording 
the source of the gift, service or advantage. It is a criminal offence and contempt of 
Parliament for a public officer to make an inaccurate or incomplete declaration.29 
The draft Assets Declaration Register is a step in the right direction, provided that it 
does not suffer stillbirth, as happened previously with similar steps meant to ensure 
disclosure of assets by parliamentarians. What is more, the draft cannot be regarded as 
sufficient in itself to fight corruption in Zimbabwe, bearing in mind that grand and 
bureaucratic corruption thrive in the country amongst public officers at all levels. Further, 
                                                          
25 Gumbo (2016). 
26 Annex 1 of the Asset Declaration Register Draft. 
27 Part I of Annex 1. 
28 Part IV of Annex 1. 
29 Annexes 1 and 2. 
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the draft does not cover politically exposed persons such as senior government officers, 
judges and military leaders who hold important positions in the public sector. 
From the above discussion, it is evident that Zimbabwe has failed in its obligation to 
formulate and implement a comprehensive assets declaration regime aimed at ensuring 
transparency and accountability in the public sector. This has aggravated corruption by 
public officers in the country, rendering the need for such a regime even more urgent. The 
Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre (ALAC) conducted a mini-survey on the need for an assets 
declaration regime in Zimbabwe. Some 98% of the respondents agreed that Zimbabwe 
should establish an assets declaration regime which should provide for public disclosure and 
that there should be follow-up in relation to false declarations.30 The ALAC’s mini-survey 
indicated clearly that an assets declaration regime is overdue in Zimbabwe.   
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
This paper has three cardinal objectives which are: 
1. To analyse the importance of assets declarations as a tool to fight corruption by 
public officers in Zimbabwe; 
2. To outline and examine the essential elements of an effective assets declaration 
system; 
3. To make recommendations on how Zimbabwe can establish an effective assets 
declaration system to ensure transparency, accountability and openness in the 
public sector. 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
The absence of assets declaration measures in Zimbabwe has made it difficult to hold 
accountable public officers implicated in corruption and found in possession of unexplained 
assets. Corruption by public officers is hard to prove, especially when there are no measures 
to ensure official acknowledgement of their assets. This research is significant as it confronts 
an important gap in the anti-corruption laws of Zimbabwe and will provide 
recommendations on how this problem may be remedied. 
  
                                                          
30 Mutonhori (2014). 
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1.6 Outline of the Remaining Chapters 
Chapter Two of the paper examines the importance of an assets declaration regime in the 
fight against corruption. Reference will be made to selected states which have used assets 
declaration systems to make progress in the fight against corruption. 
Chapter Three will analyse the indispensable elements of an effective assets 
declaration regime. It will include specific reference to assets declaration laws in certain 
other jurisdictions which have been effective in the fight against corruption by public 
officers. 
Chapter Four will offer recommendations for the formulation of an effective assets 
declaration system in Zimbabwe. It will explore also how best the system can be applied in 
harmony with other anti-corruption tools and bodies in the fight against corruption in the 
public sector. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE IMPORTANCE OF AN ASSETS DECLARATION REGIME IN ZIMBABWE 
2.1 Introduction 
The plundering of resources by public officers in Zimbabwe is a serious issue which must be 
addressed immediately. Corruption thrives in most African states due to a lack of 
transparency and accountability measures, and it takes root where democratic institutions 
have been compromised.1 One way of effectively addressing corruption is to require public 
officers to declare their assets. 
In most countries public officers, particularly those holding positions susceptible to 
corruption, are expected to declare their assets and any other financial interests. If a public 
officer does not declare his assets or if the figures show an unreasonable or abnormal 
increase in assets, the officer could be prosecuted, his unexplained assets could be forfeited 
or he could be declared unfit to hold public office. The declaration system helps in the 
prevention and management of conflicts of interests involving public officers. 
Establishing an assets declaration regime is fraught with challenges. The violation of 
the right to privacy of public officers and their families and the lack of political will are the 
two main challenges in this regard. 
2.2 Purposes of an Assets Declaration System 
An assets declaration regime has two broad anti-corruption purposes, which are prevention 
and accountability. The preventive purposes include detection and prevention of conflicts of 
interests, and increasing transparency and integrity of institutions. The accountability 
purposes include the monitoring and detection of unexplained increase in the wealth of 
public servants, fostering citizens’ confidence in public administration and providing much 
needed ammunition for anti-corruption agencies to prevent and combat corruption in public 
institutions. An assets declaration system also may help to attract foreign direct investment. 
  
                                                          
1 Kofele-Kale (2006) 698. 
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2.2.1 Detection and Prevention of Conflicts of Interests 
It is important to understand the nature of conflicts of interests as they are a sine qua non of 
corruption. A conflict of interests exists when there is a potential risk of abuse of official 
power for private gain, whilst corruption occurs when an official actually abuses his or her 
official position for private gain.2 Therefore, it may be said that generally a conflict of 
interests is embedded in any corrupt activity. 
A conflict of interests has been defined as a broad umbrella that comprises all sorts 
of tensions between official and private roles, that is, “an umbrella under which downright 
corruption and fraud are only the most obviously anti-social behaviours”.3 Due to the high 
risk and detrimental effect of any conflict of interests, it is desirable that the conflict should 
be avoided in order to ensure transparency and impartiality in the public sector at all times. 
A conflict of interests has been described as an indicator, a precursor and a 
consequence of corruption if left unbridled, and there is general agreement that the 
prevention of conflicts of interests plays a key role in the fight against corruption.4 Such 
conflicts occur at all tiers of government and can influence decision-making in courts, 
parliamentary committees, town councils, international organisations, educational 
institutions, expert committees and the like, and therefore can hinder the proper 
functioning of the public sector.5 The most unfavourable consequence of conflicts of 
interests is that the integrity of the government as a whole is brought into question, thereby 
decreasing public confidence and trust in the public sector.6 
In Zimbabwe, public officers have become involved regularly in situations where 
their public duty conflicted with their personal interests. For example, in 2013, Supa 
Mandiwanzira, the owner of a broadcasting company, was appointed as the Deputy 
Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services, which is the ministry responsible for the 
administration and supervision of broadcasting companies.7 This meant that the Minister 
was both stakeholder in and custodian of the media industry, entailing the possibility of 
abuse of power, corruption and unfair competition. 
                                                          
2 Catchick (2014) 1, 3. 
3 Auby, Breen & Perroud (2014) xiv-xv. 
4 Vlassis (2008) 5. 
5 Peters (2012) 3. 
6 Davids (2008) 
7 Kagara (2013). 
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An assets declaration system detects and prevents any apparent or potential 
conflicts of interests which a public officer may encounter. Hence its plays a pivotal role in 
the management of conflicts of interests. According to the OECD, even though it is the 
responsibility of public officers to manage their own conflicts of interests, assets 
declarations help in ensuring that such conflicts are prevented and properly managed by 
their superiors.8 Bearing in mind that conflicts of interests are an inherent component of 
corruption, their prevention and management can play a significant role in the fight against 
corruption in Zimbabwe. An assets declaration regime would remind Zimbabwean public 
officers regularly to analyse their situations for any potential conflicts of interests, and guide 
them as to the identification and avoidance of such conflicts.9 
In terms of Article 7(4) of UNCAC, States Parties are encouraged to adopt, maintain 
and strengthen systems that promote transparency and prevent conflicts of interests. An 
assets declaration law would contribute to fulfilling this hortatory obligation, since it is a 
purpose of an assets declaration system to ensure that the public sector is transparent and 
that any conflicts of interests are detected and prevented. 
2.2.2 Monitoring of Unexplained Wealth 
Corruption by public officers is very difficult to prove as usually there is no trail for 
authorities to follow. Most of the time, the parties involved in a corrupt relationship are 
equally guilty and will not testify against one another. What is more, the crime of corruption 
usually has no obvious victim who could lodge a complaint concerning the violation of his or 
her rights.  Given the absence of direct evidence and witnesses, law enforcement agencies 
have to rely upon circumstantial evidence in order to detect and prosecute corruption 
offences.10 The only signal that corruption has taken place may be the abnormal or unusual 
increase in the assets of the public officer who, more often than not, will start living lavishly, 
buy expensive cars, establish businesses and build houses, at costs which his licit income 
cannot sustain. With an assets declaration regime, the prosecution and conviction of 
corrupt officers is rendered smooth and uncomplicated.11 
                                                          
8 OECD (2015) 116. 
9 Barnes et al (2012) 13. 
10 Jahawickrama, Pope & Stolpe (2002) 24. 
11 Messick (2009) 7. 
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Assets declarations are meant to record information that will expose any assets or 
income not attributable to salary or any other legitimate sources of income.12 In Argentina, 
for example, the extraordinary 1155% increase in the declared assets of President Cristina 
Fernandez de Kircher led to many questions being asked regarding the spike in her wealth.13 
The declarations can be used as a special weapon by countries for the monitoring of assets 
owned by public officials.14 The 1990 assets declaration law of Hong Kong was the first to be 
used for the purpose of assets monitoring.15 In Albania, the assets declaration law 
emphasises that its purpose is the auditing and monitoring of the assets of public officers 
and their close relatives.16 
In Zimbabwe, one need not to go beyond the car parks at government offices to 
establish a reasonable suspicion that public officers are living beyond their means. And if 
one does go beyond the car parks to the residential areas of public officers, the most 
obvious conclusion is that public officers are living a long way beyond their means. One 
good example is that of the Local Government Minister, Savior Kasukuwere, who built a 50-
bedroom mansion in Glen Lorne, prompting people to ask “what miracle he performed” to 
raise the money required to build the mansion, considering that it could not have been 
financed by his salary and private business interests.17 
It is worth noting that assets declarations can protect public officers from false 
accusations of unexplained wealth.18 This is true especially of political leaders who might be 
targeted by political opponents in a bid to discredit them. Any unfounded allegations of 
unexplained wealth can be refuted by the assets declaration record of the public officer. 
Law enforcement agents can review the public officer’s assets declaration register if any 
suspicion arises concerning his assets or his financial behaviour.19 
Given its monitoring function, an assets declaration regime may deter public officers 
from engaging in corrupt business. The fact that their assets are recorded and monitored 
                                                          
12 Barnes et al (2012) 14. 
13 Transparency International (2013). 
14 OECD (2011) 30. 
15 Messick (2009) 13. 
16 Law on the Declaration and Audit of Assets, Financial Obligations of Elected Persons and Certain 
Public Officials No. 9049 of 2003. 
17 The Zimbabwean Mail (2016). 
18 OECD (2011) 12. 
19 Messick (2009) 7. 
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gives fair warning to the officers that any unexplained increase in their assets will be 
revealed. Being called upon to prove the origin and legitimacy of his assets affects the 
reputation of a public officer, and many may avoid corruption in order to avoid going 
through the public and humiliating process of attempting to explain ill-gotten assets. 
2.2.3 Culture of Transparency and Accountability 
Good governance is founded on a culture of integrity, transparency and accountability. A 
public sector without accountability and transparency mechanisms opens the door for 
corruption to thrive. Since public officers are vested with broad public power to decide on 
vital issues, it is essential that they are transparent and accountable in their official 
activities. United States Justice Stephen G Breyer, at the Global Forum against Corruption in 
1999, stated the following: 
As much as I hate filling out disclosure forms they are a reminder of my ethical 
responsibilities and my accountability to the public.20 
An assets declaration regime promotes a culture of transparency and accountability and 
helps to ensure that scarce resources will be used honestly and wisely for the betterment of 
the public.21 
In Kenya, unexplained or undeclared assets by judges, magistrates and police officers 
were used as the basis for the vetting of the officers.22 Any vetted officer found in 
possession of unexplained or undeclared assets was regarded as unfit to continue holding 
his office. This example indicates clearly that an assets declaration system is an important 
tool in the establishment of a culture of integrity, transparency and accountability in the 
public sector. 
2.2.4 Fostering Public Confidence in Government 
A duty is bestowed upon public officers to serve public interests, to be accountable and to 
commit to the democratic way of life. In order to foster and maintain public confidence in 
the government, it is of great importance to develop and maintain systems of 
accountability, impartiality and transparency.23 Citizens expect public officers to be 
                                                          
20 Barnes et al (2012) 7. 
21 Burdescu et al (2009) 1. 
22 Transparency International Kenya (2014). 
23 Larbi (2007) 205. 
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transparent and accountable in the performance of their public duties and not to misuse 
their public power for private gains. One of the systems developed by governments to 
promote public confidence is assets disclosure. By disclosing their assets, public officers 
declare that they have nothing to hide and that there will be no abuse of the power 
entrusted to them by the public. 
Public confidence in government is boosted when citizens are aware that public 
officers are living within their means with nothing to hide, that any conflict of interests by 
public officers is being tracked and managed, and that the assets of the officers are being 
monitored closely. 
The Zimbabwean government needs urgently to boost public confidence in the 
public sector. This year there have been massive protests in Zimbabwe both on social media 
(for example, #ThisFlag and #Tajamuka campaigns on Twitter and Facebook) and on the 
streets, by citizens demanding that the government deal with systemic corruption, bad 
governance and the plundering of resources.24 By establishing an assets disclosure regime, 
the Zimbabwean government will be sending a strong message to its citizens that corruption 
will not be tolerated and signalling its full and honest commitment to the fight against 
corruption. 
2.2.5 Empowerment of Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Anti-corruption agencies around the world have a common mandate to fight corruption. 
However, this fight is hindered by a lack of information about the assets of people 
vulnerable to corruption, making it difficult for the agencies to detect and investigate public 
officers for corruption. 
It is submitted that an assets declaration regime gives much-required ammunition to 
anti-corruption agencies in the fight against public sector corruption by providing 
information regarding the assets and financial status of public officers. The anti-corruption 
agency will verify the information received and use it to monitor increases in the assets of 
public officers or to investigate allegations of corruption or suspicious behaviour by public 
officers. An agency operating in a country with an assets declaration regime should be able 
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to carry out its mandate more effectively than one operating in a country without a 
disclosure system. 
In 2003, the Anti-Corruption Commission in Slovenia reported that senior political 
leaders did not declare valuable assets and potential conflicts of interests as required by the 
law, leading to a public outcry and calls for the resignation of said political leaders.25 This 
example shows clearly that with an assets declaration system in place, anti-graft agencies 
can become more active and effective. 
2.2.6 Asset Recovery Purposes 
Anti-corruption mechanisms support one another in the fight against corruption. Records of 
assets declarations may be used to identify and track any ill-gotten assets for the purposes 
of asset recovery. This idea is supported by UNCAC, which provides that States Parties may 
share information on assets declarations with relevant authorities in other States Parties for 
the investigation, claiming and recovery of proceeds of corruption.26 
2.2.7 Encouragement of Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment is beneficial to developing countries as it provides capital for 
investment, brings in foreign currency, creates job opportunities, increases competition in 
the local market and generates tax revenues for the government.27 Foreign direct 
investment is distributed unevenly throughout the world. It is common knowledge that 
when a foreign investor is considering investing in a developing country, key factors 
considered by said investor is the level of corruption in the country and the mechanisms in 
place to fight corruption. Nobody wants to invest in a country where there is lack of 
transparency and accountability. 
In a highly corrupt country, foreign investors will be required to pay bribes for 
licencing and other legal documentation, which ultimately will increase investment costs.28 
The cost of a damaged reputation for an investor implicated in a corruption scandal may 
force him to look for countries with lower levels of corruption.29 Even worse, in countries 
                                                          
25 Filipovic (2013). 
26 Article 52(5) of UNCAC. 
27 Quazi, Vemuri & Soliman (2014) 1. 
28 Al-Sadig (2009) 269. 
29 Zhao (2003) 46. 
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such as China and India involvement in corruption might result in serious legal action against 
the investor, including imprisonment and payment of huge fines.30 Countries with high 
levels of corruption pose a risk to investment as there is potential for political instability and 
civil unrest.31 Due to the high risks and uncertainties, foreign investors may shun such 
countries. 
An assets declaration regime encourages foreign direct investment. Investors obtain 
the impression that efforts are being made by the government to ensure accountability and 
transparency in the public sector, thereby making the country a good investment choice. 
Zimbabwe currently is struggling to attract foreign direct investment. With an assets 
declaration regime, the risks and uncertainties caused by corruption may be minimised, and 
this may help improve Zimbabwe’s potential as an investment destination. 
2.3 The Impact of Assets Declaration Laws 
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Report of 2006 contained a comparative 
study by Mukherjee & Gokcekus on whether assets declaration laws have an impact on 
preventing and combating of corruption.32 The findings of the study are listed below: 
 Countries with established assets declaration laws have lower perceived levels of 
corruption than countries which have enacted assets declaration laws recently. 
 Perceived levels of corruption are lower in countries with assets declaration laws 
which provide for prosecution of offending public officers than in countries with 
assets declaration laws which do not provide for prosecution of offenders. 
 Countries with verification mechanisms for assets declarations have lower perceived 
levels of corruption than countries which merely stockpile declarations and do not 
perform verifications. 
 Countries which allow public access to assets declaration records, either by online 
posting or by allowing public inspection at declaration registry offices, have lower 
perceived levels of corruption than countries which restrict public access to 
declarations. 
                                                          
30 Ravi (2015) 101. 
31 Zhao (2003) 46. 
32 Mukherjee & Gokcekus (2006) 325-327. 
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 There is no correlation between the level of officials required to declare assets and 
the perceived levels of corruption in the country. 
 The inclusion of assets declaration provisions in a country’s constitution does not 
reduce corruption. In other words, constitutional provisions demonstrating an 
intention to combat corruption cannot reduce corruption on their own. Thus, an 
assets declaration regime which is effective practically is required. 
The findings of Mukherjee & Gokcekus demonstrate that an effective assets declaration 
regime can be a very powerful weapon in the fight against corruption. Zimbabwe may 
benefit from such a regime provided that it is drafted in an effective and credible manner. 
The first of the findings suggests that the longer assets declaration laws are in existence, the 
better their chances of success, and therefore Zimbabwe may have to wait for some years 
after enacting an assets declaration law to realise its impact on the levels of corruption in 
the country. 
2.4 Challenges 
2.4.1 Lack of Resources 
Successful administration and monitoring of assets declarations require resources. Human 
resources are required to receive, verify and maintain assets declaration forms. Financial 
resources are required in order to remunerate staff responsible for the administration of 
assets declarations and for other related work. The Tunisian assets declaration system 
currently is facing problems of limited human and financial resources, rendering the system 
largely ineffective.33 
The issue of resources poses a huge problem for Zimbabwe, which is on its financial 
knees. The Zimbabwean government has been struggling to pay civil servants this year, and 
has had to reschedule pay dates constantly.34 The government might find it difficult to add 
more civil servants to and to cover the administrative costs incurred in the maintenance and 
management of assets declarations. This may result in an assets declaration system which is 
implemented with limited financial resources and human capital, and which, consequently, 
runs the risk of performing poorly. 
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34 Buchanan (2016). 
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2.4.2 Assets Declarations and the Right to Privacy 
The right to privacy can be regarded as a major obstacle to the establishment of an assets 
declaration regime. There is an inherent tension between the right to privacy and the public 
interest in access to information concerning public officers. Assets declarations, whether 
public or confidential, infringe on public officers’ right to privacy.35 Even more, some 
disclosure laws require the spouses and minor children of public officers to declare their 
assets as well, which undoubtedly violate their right to privacy. Some public officers may use 
the right to privacy as a shield to avoid making assets declarations, and thus undermine this 
anti-corruption mechanism.36 
There is great public interest in combating corruption, with assets declaration being 
one of the more effective ways of doing so. The public interest demands that public officers 
be accountable and that any conflict of interests be identified and managed effectively. 
However, Article 13(1)(d) of UNCAC provides for the restriction of access to information in 
terms of the law and “for the respect of the rights or reputation of others”. 
It is a huge task to find a proper balance between the right to privacy and the public 
interest in information contained in assets declarations. The variation in balancing these two 
contrasting interests is immense across countries. Some countries have confidential assets 
declarations which are accessible to the public only on good cause shown. Other countries 
require their public officers to declare their assets publicly and make the declarations 
readily available to the public. According to Neamtu & Dragos, all countries should strike a 
balance between fully disclosing assets declarations to the public for the sake of 
transparency and accountability on the one hand, and upholding the right to privacy on the 
other hand.37 
2.4.3 Human Rights and Constitutional Challenges to Illicit Enrichment 
UNCAC allows for the criminalisation of illicit enrichment, which it defines it as “a significant 
increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation 
to his or her lawful income”.38 A public officer is guilty of illicit enrichment if he or she is 
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36 Hatchard (2014) 45. 
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found in possession of wealth disproportionate to his or her salary, and said officer is unable 
to provide a satisfactory explanation for the wealth. It is a very powerful anti-corruption 
tool, but one which is very controversial. In the prosecution of illicit enrichment cases, 
assets declarations may be used for investigating and generating evidence of inexplicable 
wealth.39 
Human rights and constitutional challenges often arise in relation to the 
criminalisation and prosecution of illicit enrichment. It has been challenged for violating the 
constitutional presumption of innocence as it supposedly shifts the onus of proof from the 
state to the accused, who is required to prove his or her innocence.40 Illicit enrichment has 
been criticised for violating the right against self-incrimination as well.41 Failure by a public 
officer to explain a sudden increase in wealth results in automatic self-incrimination. 
These objections to illicit enrichment have led to international anti-corruption 
instruments not creating a hard obligation for States Parties to criminalise it. States Parties 
with constitutional concerns need not criminalise it. Zimbabwe has not criminalised illicit 
enrichment despite calls by the media, non-governmental organisations and civil societies to 
do so. There is a collective right to a corruption-free society and the Constitution provides 
for the limitation of rights in a manner which is fair, reasonable, necessary, and justifiable in 
a democratic society.42 Therefore, Zimbabwe may be able to criminalise illicit enrichment 
with little fear of serious constitutional and human rights challenges. 
2.4.4 Lack of Political Will 
The absence of political will in the fight against corruption results in a lack of commitment 
to the enforcement of anti-corruption laws and the punishment of corruption offenders.43 
Politicians can change a culture of corruption because they are the lawmakers and are 
responsible for the allocation of funds for the enforcement of anti-corruption laws.44 
Therefore, an assets declaration law is bound to fail in the absence of political will, as there 
will be no commitment by lawmakers to ensure the successful implementation of the law. 
                                                          
39 Muzila et al (2012) 41. 
40 Muzila et al (2012) 30. 
41 Muzila et al (2012) 32. 
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43 Stapenhurst, Johnston & Pelizzo (2006) 252. 
44 Quah (2013) 153. 
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The lack of political will may result also in politicians not providing sufficient funds for the 
management and monitoring of assets declarations. Again, a poorly funded assets 
declaration system will result in the stockpiling of declarations which are not verified and 
monitored, and thus the system is doomed to failure. 
Assets declaration laws target politicians as well and this may lead to their 
supporting reluctantly the establishment of an assets declaration system. In Zimbabwe, 
politicians are well-known for being corrupt and for possessing unexplained wealth. 
Therefore, they might hesitate to legislate an assets disclosure system which could be used 
against them. Perhaps this is why, despite several calls for the introduction of an assets 
declaration regime in Zimbabwe, there has been no material progress yet. 
The mobilisation of parliamentarians to fight corruption and to enact effective anti-
corruption laws is an important step in the establishment of an efficient anti-corruption 
system.45 Johnston & Kpundeh observe correctly that the lack of political will result in anti-
corruption measures becoming empty gestures or will camouflage continued abuses.46 
2.4.5 Unpunished Corruption 
Closely linked to lack of political will is the problem of corruption committed by politically 
connected individuals going unpunished. Unpunished corruption encourages further 
corruption, leading to its becoming widespread or systemic, and eventually to its being 
accepted as inevitable. 
In Zimbabwe, impunity for corruption by senior public officers has been a huge issue 
since 1980. Some of the most famous unpunished corruption scandals in Zimbabwe are 
recorded below. 
 The Willowvale Scandal of 1989 involved senior politicians and well-connected 
individuals who used a government platform to buy cars at factory prices, reselling 
them for profit on the black market.47 President Mugabe stopped further 
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investigations by the Sandura Commission which was set up to deal with the scandal 
and later pardoned all the culprits involved in the scam.48 
 The 1995 VIP Housing Scandal included the looting of contributions made by civil 
servants to a housing fund.49 Instead of being used to help civil servants, the funds 
were diverted to an illegal housing scheme which built mansions for top government 
officials, including the commissioner of police, a judge and the First Lady, with some 
officials even being given loans. Needless to say, the contributing civil servants did 
not receive houses and, what is more, various construction projects were suspended 
nationwide.50 Although the officials who benefited were pressurised into paying back 
the money, no one was prosecuted. 
 The looting of the War Victims Compensation Fund in 1997 involved funds which 
were meant to compensate war veterans who were disabled physically during the 
liberation struggle. The Fund was looted by able-bodied politicians and senior public 
officers, including the police commissioner who claimed 90% disability 
compensation.51 Despite the public outcry and a report from a commission of 
inquiry, not one person was prosecuted. 
 The Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company Scandal involved top government officials 
looting resources from the company. A report by the National Economic Conduct 
Inspectorate provided a list of the government officials implicated and exposed how 
funds were siphoned off by way of controversial tenders, expensive trips and 
dubious allowances given to top government officials.52 Again, no prosecutions took 
place and the people incriminated, including the country’s then Vice-President, 
continued to hold key government positions. 
From the above examples, it is clear that impunity for corruption is a major issue which may 
hinder the establishment of an effective assets declaration system. Such a system requires 
zero tolerance towards corruption and a categorical commitment to accountability. 
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2.4.6 Independence of Assets Declarations Administrators 
The protection of officers who administer assets declaration against political and any other 
undue interferences is critical. The declaration office should be able to operate 
independently and without fear of any outside influence. In Zimbabwe, political interference 
is a common characteristic of anti-corruption work. For example, in March 2013 the 
Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission obtained a search warrant from the High Court to 
raid and search the offices of three Ministers. However, this warrant was never executed 
because the investigating officials were arrested and later dismissed from the Commission.53 
In 2016, the Commission attempted to raid and search some government offices, but it was 
deterred by a strong warning from a senior government official.54 
2.4.7 Absence of Common Enforceable Standards 
The absence of minimum international standards or guidelines on the structuring and 
implementation of an assets declaration system is a challenge for countries wanting to 
establish such a system.55 All the international anti-corruption laws contain provisions on 
the need for an assets declaration law, but they do not prescribe or suggest the form which 
such a law should take. This lacuna allows countries to design a system which suits their 
local circumstances. Ironically, it also empowers the politicians who are its targets to 
subvert the assets declaration system. In the absence of minimum standards or guidelines, 
lack of political will may lead to the establishment of an assets declaration system which is 
designed to fail.56 
2.4.8 Lack of Clarity 
Lack of clarity in assets declaration laws is a big issue. Questions concerning the public 
officers who are to make declarations, to whom declarations should be made and the assets 
to be declared have to be answered unambiguously.57 If the law is not clear enough, corrupt 
officers may take advantage of the deficiency not to declare ill-gotten assets, and the 
declaration system may be rendered ineffective. Therefore, it is important that the drafters 
of an assets declaration law make it crystal clear who must declare what, when and how. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that an assets declaration regime is an essential anti-corruption 
tool. Despite the challenges likely to be faced in its establishment and application, such a 
regime remains a great resource for preventing corruption, promoting public confidence in 
the public sector and detecting unexplained wealth. The impact of an assets disclosure 
system in the fight against corruption should not be ignored by legislators. It is important, 
however, to note that an assets declaration system should not be seen and applied as a 
stand-alone anti-corruption measure, but as part of an integrated package of anti-
corruption measures.58 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE ASSETS DECLARATION REGIME FOR ZIMBABWE 
3.1 Introduction 
The absence of international standards for an effective assets declaration regime has left 
countries with difficult questions regarding the establishment of such a regime. Some of 
these questions include: Who should be required to declare assets? What are the assets to 
be declared? How frequently should public officers be required to declare their assets? Who 
should be responsible for handling declarations? Should the public have access to the 
declarations? Should the declarations be verified and who should be responsible for the 
verification? What are the sanctions for non-compliance with assets declaration 
requirements? 
The significant differences in assets declaration systems around the world indicate 
the difficulties countries have had in answering these thorny questions. The OECD 
recommends that countries take into account their legal traditions and past experiences, 
and evaluate current issues to determine the legal approach to assets declarations which 
most likely will generate support among politicians, public officers and the general public.1 
It is inevitable that Zimbabwe will be faced with these critical questions when 
establishing an assets declaration regime. This chapter will attempt to engage some of these 
rather problematic issues. 
3.2 Aims and Objectives of an Assets Declaration System 
The first step in the establishment of an effective assets declaration regime is to define 
clearly its aims and objectives.2 An assets declaration regime which is not clear as to its 
purpose is doomed to fail, as nothing then would be known of what such regime intends to 
achieve. Although there may be a variety of purposes, an assets declaration system would 
be directed mainly at combating illicit enrichment, or at identifying and preventing conflicts 
of interests, or at both of these objectives.3 According to the World Bank, the objectives of 
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24 
the system should be determined by the behaviours which the system intends to address 
and by the institutional or political environment in which it will operate.4 
3.2.1 Conflicts of Interests 
An assets declaration regime which has the primary purpose of preventing and managing 
conflicts of interests does not intend to presume illegal behaviour on the part of the public 
official.5 Rather, it offers assistance to avoid situations which may lead to such conflicts and 
to ensure that the declarant is not subjected to accusations or suspicions of bias or 
corruption. Here the responsible assets declaration agency would play an advisory role for 
preventive purposes.6 This is an ex ante purpose. 
The enactment and implementation of UNCAC has seen prevention of corruption 
being brought into the spotlight, with an entire chapter in the treaty dedicated to 
preventive measures.7 This shift in approach has led to prevention of conflicts of interests 
becoming an important anti-corruption mechanism. There can be no doubt that conflicts of 
interests are at the heart of the abuse of power for personal gain in the public sector. 
Therefore, it would be difficult and unwise not to include prevention of conflicts of interests 
as a purpose in the establishment of an assets declaration regime. 
3.2.2 Illicit Enrichment 
A primary or even exclusive focus on illicit enrichment in an assets declaration system is 
preferable in countries or sectors where there are high levels of perceived corruption and 
impunity.8 Zimbabwe’s score of 21 on the 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index shows very 
high levels of perceived corruption.9 Concern with illicit enrichment becomes even more 
desirable in the context of the huge unexplained wealth owned by so many public officers in 
Zimbabwe. With combating illicit enrichment as a primary purpose, the declaration office’s 
main role would be to focus on the assets of public officials in order to detect unexplained 
wealth.10 This is an ex post facto purpose since there is a concern with corruption which has 
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occurred already and with the prosecution of those found in possession of unexplained 
wealth. 
Both purposes, the first relating to illicit enrichment and the second to conflicts of 
interests, are essential components of an assets declaration regime for Zimbabwe. However, 
it must be understood that the country likely will face huge challenges in achieving both 
these purposes of assets declarations. It will have to contend with the problem of balancing 
the preventive and advisory role in relation to conflicts of interests with the enforcement 
role for the detection of illicit enrichment.11 Deciding on either purpose is difficult. On the 
one hand, management of conflicts of interests is a fundamental anti-corruption tool which 
cannot be ignored in the establishment of an assets declaration regime in Zimbabwe. 
UNCAC even makes special reference to conflicts of interests as a purpose of assets 
declarations, thereby confirming its importance.12 On the other hand, confronting illicit 
enrichment is equally important as it deals with unexplained wealth in the hands of public 
officers, which is a phenomenon especially common in Zimbabwe. 
The objective of the assets declaration regime determines the human capital 
required for the assets declaration agency. For dealing with illicit enrichment, the 
administrators should be equipped with verification and investigation techniques to monitor 
and detect any unexplained wealth. For preventing conflicts of interests, the administrators 
should be familiar with conflict of interests rules and with the methods needed to detect 
and manage such conflicts.13 
3.3 Subjects of the Assets Declaration Regime 
When determining which public officers are to declare assets, it is important to consider the 
availability of resources, the levels of perceived risk in different sectors of the public service 
and the overall objectives of the assets declaration regime.14 Defining the subjects of the 
regime determines the human and financial resources required to implement the regime. 
Zimbabwe should consider carefully the costs and benefits of a broader coverage (which 
would encompass all public officers) or narrower coverage (applicable only to certain public 
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officers).15 In this regard, it should be noted that assets declaration regimes which require 
all public officers to declare assets usually experience difficulties in the handling, verification 
and monitoring of the declarations.16 For example, Cameroon requires all public officers to 
declare their assets but the exercise has been made difficult by a lack of resources and 
capacity, leading to the system being implemented poorly.17 
An assets declaration regime should at least cover all senior public officers in all 
three branches of government. This is because these public officers possess significant 
decision-making authority and may find themselves in situations in which their public and 
private interests conflict.18 They also possess discretionary powers and access to public 
funds, which make them susceptible to seeking profit from corrupt activities.19 Junior public 
officers usually are involved in bureaucratic corruption as they demand or solicit small 
amounts of money to perform their duties. Such grease or speed money does not change 
the financial status of junior public officers to the extent that it can be detected by an assets 
declaration regime.20 However, endemic bureaucratic corruption by junior public officers is 
unacceptable and should be addressed. Magistrates and some junior public officers, such as 
those in the vehicle inspection and customs and tax departments, occupy positions and 
enjoy discretionary powers which tend to predispose them towards corruption. For 
example, 32 officers from the Vehicle Inspectorate Departments (VID) depots in Zimbabwe 
were fired for corruption this year and 200 driving and provisional licences which were 
issued corruptly were cancelled.21 
Zimbabwe is experiencing serious financial problems and to require all public officers 
to declare their assets may result in poor and uneven implementation of the assets 
declaration regime. The filing population in Zimbabwe should commence at a manageable 
size, by requiring disclosure from all senior public officers, from junior public officers 
occupying positions at high risk of corruption, and from members of the judiciary. This will 
be a good start and should suffice until such time when there are enough resources and 
sufficient capacity to require all public officers to declare their assets. 
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Needless to say, tan assets declaration system in Zimbabwe should include the 
President and Vice-Presidents, who are the heads of state and government.22 This may 
encourage other public officers to declare their assets as well. All cabinet members and 
parliamentarians should be required to declare assets, given their discretionary powers and 
access to public funds. It should be kept in mind that there is a draft Assets Declaration 
Register available which is intended to require parliamentarians and cabinet members to 
declare their assets.23 The draft does not provide for the declaration of debts and liabilities 
nor does it cover the assets and liabilities of the declarant’s spouse and close family 
members. The draft should be repealed or amended by a comprehensive assets declaration 
regime which will be cover the assets, debts and liabilities of the designated public officers 
as well as of their spouses and close family members. 
In order to curb judicial corruption, all judges and magistrates should be required to 
file declarations, since they enjoy discretionary powers and their offices are vulnerable to 
corruption. Judicial corruption in Zimbabwe has increased in recent years, with a number of 
magistrates being found guilty of corruption and with a number of judges being involved in 
land-grabbing programmes by the ruling party.24 Judicial corruption is especially worrisome 
as it undermines the rule of law and results in the miscarriage of justice. Article 11 of UNCAC 
recognises the crucial role of the judiciary in the fight against corruption, and places an 
obligation on States Parties to strengthen the integrity of the judiciary and to prevent 
opportunities for judicial corruption. Requiring disclosure of assets by judicial officers is one 
way of fulfilling this obligation, as there is detection and management of conflicts of 
interests and there is monitoring of the assets of judicial officers for illicit enrichment. 
The Government of Zimbabwe runs several state enterprises and parastatals as a 
means to gain revenue and to provide essential services to the general public. These state-
run enterprises provide avenues for creating jobs for friends and relatives, as well as for the 
abuse of power to accumulate wealth.25 The Auditor-General, Mildred Chiri, revealed 
recently that Zimbabwe is losing tens of millions of dollars in corruption scandals that are 
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plaguing state enterprises and parastatals.26 Due to the inclination to corruption in state 
enterprises and parastatals in Zimbabwe, senior officers must be required to declare their 
assets. In this connection, it is noteworthy that earlier this year, the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Public Accounts recommended that all board members of state enterprises 
and parastatals should be required to disclose their assets before assuming office.27 
Corrupt public officers usually hide unlawfully obtained assets under the names of 
their spouses, children and close relatives.28 The dread of invading the privacy of family 
members of public officers counts against extending the disclosures to them. However, 
there is a real danger that non-disclosure of their family members’ assets will help public 
officers to evade assets declaration laws by registering their property as belonging to family 
members. It has been argued that assets of a couple are intertwined and that any 
separation is artificial, adding to the need for disclosure of the assets of a spouse.29 The 
private interests of the family member may hold the same potential as the private interests 
of the public officer to interfere with the performance of public duties.30 Some African 
countries, such as Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Nigeria, require public officers to declare 
the assets of their spouses and single or dependent children in a separate declaration in 
order to prevent concealment of assets.31 It is submitted that the assets declaration law in 
Zimbabwe should include spouses, all dependent or single children and other close family 
members of the designated public officer. There should be a section in the declaration form 
of such public officers which provides for assets owned by the family members. 
3.4 Contents of the Declarations 
An assets disclosure regime requires public officers to declare assets, income and other 
businesses or positions, gifts and liabilities. It is important that a disclosure regime be 
precise on the details to be declared and to leave no room for confusion and uncertainties. 
Lack of clarity regarding what is to be declared threatens the effectiveness of the assets 
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disclosure regime.32 At the same time, it has to be ensured that the regime does not require 
trivial declarations, for example, clothes and shoes, which may become a burden to both 
declarants and the declaration agency. A threshold value of assets to be declared should be 
determined to avoid this problem. When the sole purpose of the declaration regime is to 
prevent conflicts of interests, exact asset values need not be disclosed.33 When the purpose 
of the disclosure regime is to monitor unexplained wealth, then asset values and exact 
amounts from all sources of income must be revealed.34 
3.4.1 Immovable Assets 
Zimbabwe should require all immovable assets owned partly or wholly by the designated 
public officer to be declared. Such declarations may help to divulge certain interests of the 
public officer. For example, property owned by a public officer in a certain area may show 
his or her personal interests in that area.35 
In order to protect the privacy of the public officers, declarations containing the 
details of their residential houses should not be made public. However, the suburb in which 
the property is situated may be disclosed so as to differentiate one immovable asset from 
another. Any asset owned partly by the public officer should be declared, including the 
details of the co-owner. In Latvia, for example, public officers are required to declare assets 
permanently used by them, even though they are not the owners.36 The estimated value of 
the assets should be declared also in order to ascertain the worth of the assets. A copy of 
the title deeds may be essential in determining whether the public officer is the legitimate 
owner of the property. 
3.4.2 Movable Assets 
Movable assets which are required to be registered by law, such as vehicles, vessels and 
livestock, should be declared, including details regarding their registration number, origin 
and year of acquisition. Other movable assets which do not require registration by law, such 
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as jewellery, art and precious metals, but which are worth in excess of a threshold amount, 
should be declared as well. 
3.4.3 Other Positions, Businesses and Sources of Income 
Some public officers own businesses and obtain income from sources other than their 
remuneration as public officers. Requiring declaration of these other sources of income 
determines the officer’s private interests and the value of such interests as shown by the 
declared amounts. Also, when compared to the official salary of the public officer, the other 
sources of income may allow for some assessment as to whether the public office 
represents a priority to the declarant.37 
Income from other sources, such as financial investments, business assets, private 
sector employment, professional services, membership of boards and directorships, 
gambling or lottery and other public sector employment, should be declared.38 Even 
positions from which the public officer does not receive any salary, such as volunteering in a 
charity organisation, should be disclosed as there may be a potential conflict between public 
interests and private interests in such positions. 
3.4.4 Official Salary 
In 2014, it was revealed that the chief executive officer of Premier Service Medical Aid 
Society was receiving a basic monthly salary of US$230 000 in a salary scam which rocked 
the state enterprise.39 This is one of the examples indicating the dangers of the salaries of 
public officers not being disclosed to the public. Disclosing the salary helps in comparing it 
with the assets or lifestyle of the public officer. It also helps in the assessment of the role 
and significance of the public office itself in relation to the officer’s other sources of income. 
3.4.5 Gifts 
Gifts between people with a working relationship have been regarded as an occupational 
risk.40 According to Mauss, receiving a gift creates a moral obligation to reciprocate.41 This 
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becomes a problem for public officers who might feel compelled to award contracts or 
other advantages in their official capacity in reciprocation for gifts received. Due to the 
influence of gifts upon decision making by public officers, there is a growing consensus that 
gifts above a given value must be declared. The main purpose of declaration of gifts is to 
prevent and manage conflicts of interests rather than to detect unexplained wealth.42 
UNCAC recognises this purpose by providing for declarations by public officials of 
“substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest may result with respect to 
their functions as public officials”.43 
Substantial gifts, advantages and other benefits, such as financial sponsorships and 
sponsored visits, should be declared.44 A minimum value of gifts to be declared should be 
determined in order to avoid trivial declarations. Details such as the origin, reasons for and 
date of gifts, as well as other information, such as the address of gifted immovable assets or 
registration details of gifted movable assets, should be disclosed. 
3.4.6 Debts and Liabilities 
All debts, obligations, loans, credit cards, mortgages, guarantees and co-signatures ought to 
be declared.45 Liabilities ought to be included in declarations as they are prone to abuse. For 
example, low interest rates or other appealing off-market terms and conditions for loans 
can be offered to public officers with a view to influencing their behaviour corruptly.46 
3.5 Public Access to Declarations 
Assets declarations either may be confidential or subject to public access. A confidential 
declaration regime which restricts public access poses a problem for many countries as it 
demands a politically neutral declaration office accompanied by confidence of citizens in the 
regime.47 The continued political interference in anti-corruption work and low citizen 
confidence in the government makes confidential declarations undesirable for Zimbabwe. 
Therefore, an assets declaration regime for Zimbabwe should allow public access in order to 
achieve its objectives. UNCAC recognises the need for the support and involvement of the 
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public in the fight against corruption.48 One way of involving the public is to ensure that it 
has access to assets declarations by public officers. 
Striking a balance between public access to declarations and the protection of the 
privacy of filers remains a major issue in the establishment of an assets declaration regime. 
On the one hand, global experiences have shown that public access to declarations 
increases the impact and effectiveness of assets declaration regimes.49 On the other hand, 
the right to privacy of filers is infringed by public disclosures. 
Public access allows the public to scrutinise the declarations, giving investigative 
journalists, media, scholars and civil society groups a chance to become involved in the 
monitoring of public officers’ assets.50 In other words, public declarations enable the public 
to participate actively in the implementation of the assets declaration regime. The public 
usually is aware of the lifestyles of many public officers as the media publish stories of the 
luxurious habits and expensive tastes of these officers. This kind of information places the 
public in a good position to monitor the lifestyles of public officers and verify assets 
declared by them. 
Public access to declarations signals the government’s commitment to conduct 
business in a transparent and accountable manner. Public officers will be motivated to 
comply with assets declaration laws, knowing that they are subject to public scrutiny. This 
may result also in public officers refraining from looting and engaging in corrupt activities 
for fear of being questioned by the public. Public confidence in the government may be 
restored or enhanced as the public is made aware that public officers are living within their 
means and that their assets are being monitored by the relevant authorities, as well as 
publicly. In America, confidential declarations were replaced with public declarations soon 
after the Watergate Scandals in the late 1970s in order to restore the confidence of 
Americans in the government.51 
However, public access to declarations has accompanying dangers. Requiring public 
officers to declare the details of their wealth can put their persons or lives in danger as 
targets for criminals. If criminals are made aware of their riches, they well may resort to 
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kidnapping the declarant or a family member for ransom. The need to protect the security 
of public officers has forced countries with high crime rates, such as Colombia and Haiti, to 
restrict public access to assets declarations.52 
The second objection to public declarations is the infringement of the right to 
privacy. There is no doubt that the privacy of public officers is infringed as their private 
lifestyles and business are made public and subjected to public scrutiny. Even more, 
requiring spouses and children of public officers to declare their assets undoubtedly violates 
their right to privacy since they are under no legal obligation to be transparent in their 
private affairs. 
This tension between the need for public declarations and the right to privacy poses 
a problem for the establishment of an assets declaration regime in Zimbabwe. According to 
Neamtu & Dragos, all countries should strike a balance between fully disclosing assets 
declarations to the public for the sake of transparency and accountability, and upholding the 
right to privacy.53 In Zimbabwe, both the right to privacy and right of access to information 
are subject to limitation only in terms of a law of general application and in a fair, 
reasonable, necessary and justifiable manner.54 Preventing conflicts of interests and 
exposing unexplained wealth of public officers are serious and legitimate public interests 
which legitimately may restrict the right to privacy. In several countries it has been argued 
that individuals have a choice to hold a public office and if they chose to do so, a part of the 
price they have to pay is to have public disclosure of their assets given priority over their 
right to privacy.55 If the person is concerned to protect his or her privacy rights, then he or 
she should not stand for or hold any public office. 
There are different ways in which assets declarations can be made available to the 
public. Access can be granted through the media, official gazettes or registers open to public 
scrutiny.56 With this approach, there are no access requirements as the declarations are 
made available directly to the public. Registers at assets declaration offices can be accessed 
by any person during opening hours. To strike the balance between the right to privacy and 
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access to information, some countries, such as Mongolia, Hong Kong and Kyrgyzstan, rank 
declarations based on seniority, with high-level officers’ declarations being accessible to the 
public and low-level officers’ declarations being available upon request.57 
Some countries require assets declarations to be kept in the assets declaration office 
and to be accessible to the public only upon request. This approach poses a problem for a 
country like Zimbabwe, where bureaucracy may slow down access to information. The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe provides for the right of access to information in the custody of 
the state or any government body insofar as the information is required in the interests of 
public accountability.58  It further requires the enactment of national legislation which gives 
effect to this right, but which restricts access to information “to the extent that the 
restriction is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on 
openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom”.59 
Zimbabwe has a statute which regulates the public’s right of access to information 
and records held by a public body, as well as protection of the right to privacy.60 The Access 
to Information and Protection of Privacy Act applies to all matters relating to access to 
information held by a public body, and it is superior to any law which is in conflict or 
inconsistent with it.61 Every person has a right of access to information in the custody of a 
public body, subject to certain limitations, such as disclosures which endanger the safety of 
any person.62 
Section 24 provides that the right to information may be limited if disclosure would 
harm the business interests of a third party. Further, section 25 provides that the right to 
information may be limited if the disclosure results in the unreasonable invasion of a third 
party’s personal privacy. The section stipulates various grounds which must be considered in 
order to determine whether disclosure unreasonably will invade the privacy of the person. 
Therefore, before an assets declaration office may allow requests for documents, it must 
consider all the provisions of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act. If the 
head of a public body intends to grant access to information concerning  a third party, the 
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latter must be informed of the decision and given up to twenty days to contest such 
decision.63 This poses a problem for the effectiveness of the assets declaration regime, as 
the public officer is given ample time to make the assets disappear. For example, if there is a 
tip off regarding a public officer’s bank account containing large amounts of money, the 
money can be moved quickly before access to his or her declarations is granted. 
For the sake of maintaining parity between the right to privacy and the right of 
access to information, Zimbabwe should allow the public access to declarations while 
ensuring that the registration numbers and location of the assets are not disclosed, in order 
to protect declarants. All the bank accounts details, debts and other liabilities of the public 
officers should not be made public as they are too sensitive and their disclosure would be an 
outright and unreasonable violation of the right to privacy. Access to confidential 
information should be governed by the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act. 
It is important for the assets declaration law to criminalise any misuse or abuse of 
information obtained from the declarations. This will protect public officers from being 
intimidated or blackmailed on their basis of their declarations. 
3.6 Clear Declaration Forms and Procedure 
The assets declaration forms must be clear and reasonably concise.64 They should be in 
official languages understood by most people, which are Shona, Ndebele and English in 
Zimbabwe. The body to which the declarations must be submitted and other submission 
requirements should be made clear to the filers. The declaration forms should state the 
deadline for submissions and identify sanctions for the failure to disclose assets, for 
incomplete declarations and for inaccurate declarations.65 
The widespread use of the Internet has made electronic submissions more desirable 
than a physical collection system.66 Electronic submissions may result in increased 
compliance by declarants as the forms can be filled and submitted from any location with an 
internet connection. The declaration office will find it easier to handle electronic forms than 
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paper forms, by use of an automated system which allows information to be entered 
directly into a database.67 
3.7 Filing Frequency 
The frequency of filing declarations should be specified in the assets declaration law. 
Determining the filing frequency involves weighing up factors such as the need for up-to-
date information, the avoidance of over-filing and the risk of non-compliance.68 Three 
patterns common to filing frequency requirements are periodical, annual or biennial 
declarations; updating declarations whenever there is a significant increase in assets; and 
declaring assets upon entering and leaving public office.69 
For Zimbabwe, the filing frequency must be decided bearing in mind the country’s 
scarcity of resources and its limited capacity to handle many declarations. The ideal filing 
frequency, to begin with, would be to require a declaration of assets upon assumption of 
office in order to determine and prevent any potential conflicts of interests. The declaration 
regime should then require filing of declarations by the designated public officers annually, 
with a specific deadline set for submission. Also, public officers should be required to 
declare their assets upon leaving office, for whatever reason. Mandatory declarations 
should continue for a certain period after the individual leaves her or his position, in order 
to capture deferred illicit enrichment.70 
3.8 Administration of Declarations 
The administration of declarations is a key feature in the establishment, implementation 
and maintenance of an effective assets declaration regime. Poor handling of declarations 
results in poor implementation of the declaration regime. Therefore, handling of 
declarations should be done by impartial, skilled and experienced administrators with no 
political interference. 
If the sole purpose of the regime is to prevent and manage conflicts of interests, 
then declarations should be filed with superiors who have fullest knowledge regarding 
public officers’ duties and whether a particular private interest will interfere with their 
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official duties.71 Declarations may be administered internally, especially for legislators and 
judges who fear that an outside administration may compromise their independence.72 
However, internal administration may undermine transparency and the independence of 
administrators who might have a close working relationship with the declarant, resulting in 
reluctance on their part to manage conflicts of interests and to verify declarations. 
Requiring the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission to administer declarations may 
mean burdening it with too many duties, which may affect the effectiveness of the regime. 
Also, the Commission is weak and characterised by political interference, which likely will 
affect the proper handling of declarations.73 The best approach is for Zimbabwe to set up an 
independent office which has the sole responsibility of administering assets declarations. 
This approach will ensure the independence of administrators and may result in effective 
administration. For example, in Malawi the Office of the Director of Public Officers’ 
Declarations has the single mandate of administration of assets declarations.74 This Office is 
independent of any person or authority, and it is accountable only to the parliament of 
Malawi.75 Zimbabwe may benefit from a similar independent assets declaration office (ADO) 
which is responsible solely for the administration of assets declarations. 
The ADO’s core functions should include receiving and verifying declarations. Office 
members should provide advice and technical assistance to declarants on the correct 
method of filing. There should be a reminder from the ADO to declarants notifying them of 
their obligation to submit declarations, including the corresponding procedure, benefits and 
penalties.76 The ADO should publish names of compliant and non-compliant officers, 
together with a summary of their declarations. It should have the power to recommend 
sanctions for non-compliant officers to the relevant employment officer. It must have the 
authority to report any evidence or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by a listed 
public officer to the relevant prosecutorial authorities after verification of declarations. 
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The ADO should be granted the resources and capacity needed properly to 
administer and verify declarations, and to monitor unexplained wealth of public officers. In 
this regard, it is important to note that ill-skilled and poorly trained administrators affect the 
effective implementation of the assets declaration system. The ADO should staffed by 
professionals with a variety of skills and experience, in such areas as accounting, auditing, 
customs, banking, forensics, legal practice and law enforcement. It should include members 
from the Zimbabwe Republic Police, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Zimbabwe, the Attorney General’s Office, the Auditor General’s 
Office, the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission. 
The political appointment and removal of the director and deputy directors of the 
ADO by the president should be avoided.  Political appointments and dismissals undermine 
the independence of the declarations office as directors may be intimated and coerced into 
serving the political interests of ruling party rather than the public interest. 
3.9 Monitoring Committee 
The Zimbabwe parliament ought to establish a monitoring committee which oversees the 
powers and functions of the ADO in order to ensure that it is independent and that there is 
no abuse of power.77 The committee should receive annual reports from the ADO and 
should be able to take appropriate actions to enforce compliance by public officers.78 
3.10 Verification of Declarations 
A legal requirement for the timely verification of declarations by qualified and impartial 
officials should be included in any well-designed assets declaration regime.79 Verification 
assists in the identification and management of conflicts of interests and in the detection of 
unexplained wealth. Irregularities or inconsistencies in declarations can be picked up by an 
experienced verification officer, particularly if the law permits the officer to follow up and 
seek further clarification or confirmation.80 The fact that assets declarations are verified may 
establish a credible incentive for officers truthfully to declare their assets. If declarants know 
that the declarations are not authenticated, there is a risk of the ADO accumulating useless 
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information which does not represent the financial status of the declarants.81 In Georgia, for 
example, verification includes the oversight body drawing a list of all non-compliant officers 
from the declarations register and posting the list online, which practice has led to increased 
compliance by public officers.82 
An effective verification process may result also in the revelation of discrepancies 
between assets declarations and other reliable and available information regarding the 
declarant’s assets, such as tax declarations and property registries. Terms such as “verify” 
and “investigate” need to be defined clearly, as prosecutors might claim that they are the 
only ones with the authority to investigate and may end up interfering in the work of anti-
corruption agencies inquiring into the accuracy of a declarant’s statement.83 
Barnes et al provide for different approaches to the verification of assets 
declarations. Individual declarations may be verified for internal consistency in responses. A 
current declaration may be compared with previous declarations by the public officer to 
monitor changes in wealth over time. There may be cross-checking of declarations with 
external sources and databases, such as tax registries and deeds offices. Declarations may 
be analysed for any potential incompatibilities or conflicts of interests. The lifestyles of 
public officers may be checked to corroborate consistency with the declared assets.84 
The verification approach or approaches chosen depends largely on the availability 
of resources and the existence of a legal provision requiring verification. Verification of large 
volumes of declarations should be avoided as it may result in very high costs with little 
accompanying revelations.85 A risk-based approach by the ADO is recommended for 
concentrating on enhanced substantiation of declarations by public officers who are more 
susceptible to corruption. Risk-based verifications are better than random verifications, 
which may be perceived to be politically influenced.86 Verification of assets declarations may 
be conducted also if there are any suspicions or complaints regarding the legitimacy or 
accuracy of declared assets, or when the public officer is under investigation for corruption 
or other economic crimes. 
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Public disclosure allows the citizenry to be involved in the verification of 
declarations. Lifestyle checks may yield more reliable findings than other verification 
techniques if there is an effective complaints mechanism and public access to declarations, 
which allow citizens, civil society bodies and the media to scrutinise declarations and 
lifestyles. For example, in 2003 a Philippine reporter revealed false declarations by many 
public officers after comparing their expensive lifestyles to their public declarations.87 
Zimbabwe should ensure that a legal requirement for timely verification of 
declarations is included in its assets declaration regime. The ADO should have the primary 
responsibility of confirming declarations received. In order to validate declarations 
effectively, the ADO should have access to documents or records from other public 
institutions and to data from banks and other commercial institutions. Further, it should 
have the authority to request an explanation from the declarant or other persons, to 
request verifications by any other institutions and to request an expert’s opinion.88  There 
should be an effective complaints mechanism to allow the public to file complaints and 
present useful information to the ADO regarding discrepancies between the declaration 
forms and the actual assets of the declarant. 
An assets declaration regime in Zimbabwe should allow declarants to rectify 
information in the declaration forms within a stipulated period after submission. The 
opportunity to rectify information makes the declaration regime user-friendlier and avoids 
the application of sanctions for unintentional omissions or mistakes.89 However, the system 
should not be too lenient as the effectiveness of the regime may be compromised by 
dishonest public officers presenting false information, knowing that in case of suspicion they 
can rectify with impunity.90 
3.11 Sanctions for Non-Compliance 
The effectiveness of an assets disclosure regime is linked directly to its ability to provide 
credible warnings that those who do not comply with the disclosure requirements will be 
punished.91 A regime with unpredictable outcomes undermines the confidence of the public 
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and of the declarants in it as there are no meaningful sanctions to back up clear and 
objective instructions.92 The absence of sanctions or the imposition of light sanctions may 
tempt public officers to breach the assets declaration laws, with knowledge that there are 
little accompanying consequences. 
There are two broad categories of violations of assets declaration requirements, 
namely, violations relating to the duty to declare and violations relating to the information 
filed.93 The former category includes late submission and non-submission of declarations. 
The latter category includes unintentionally false declarations, deliberately false 
declarations and incomplete declarations.94 
Sanctions for breaches of assets declaration laws should be proportionate to the 
violation but severe enough effectively to deter future violations. Criminal sanctions, fines, 
administrative sanctions and reputational penalties should be considered as part of a basket 
of effective punitive measures. Perceived levels of corruption are lower in countries with 
assets declaration laws which provide for criminal sanctions for non-compliant public 
officers.95 In Zimbabwe, it is a criminal offence for a public officer intentionally to conceal 
from a principal any personal interest in a transaction.96 However, illicit enrichment is not a 
criminal offence in Zimbabwe and there is a need for its criminalisation in order to hold 
accountable declarants in possession of unexplained wealth. 
The penalties for criminal conviction may be imprisonment for a certain period, with 
an option to pay a substantial fine. In Pakistan, parliamentarians may be imprisoned for up 
to five years for filing false declarations.97 Administrative sanctions, such as suspension or 
dismissal, may be imposed also. Reputational penalties include publication of the names of 
public officers who do not comply with assets declaration requirements. 
The importance of political will for the imposition of sanctions should be 
emphasised. The success of any assets declaration regime depends on the existence of 
political will to enforce the laws. Zimbabwe has a culture of impunity for politicians and 
protection of political comrades against corruption allegations. For example, President 
                                                          
92 Barnes et al (2012) 71. 
93 OECD (2011) 80. 
94 See OECD (2011) 80. 
95 Chene (2008) 2. 
96 Section 173 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act of 2006 (Chapter 9: 23). 
97 Martini (2013) 6. 
 
 
 
 
42 
Robert Mugabe reportedly blocked the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission from 
arresting the Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education, Jonathan Moyo, on corruption 
charges for allegedly siphoning off public funds to finance political campaigns.98 This 
indicates a problem of political interference in the anti-corruption project and therefore 
undermines the efforts to hold senior political leaders accountable. There is a need for 
commitment to punish any person, at whatever level, power or influence, who does not 
comply with assets declaration laws. This will send a message of zero tolerance towards 
non-compliance with assets declaration laws and towards corruption at large. 
The law should be clear about the institutions responsible for dealing with non-
compliant officers. Unclear demarcation of power and mandates among anti-corruption 
institutions in Zimbabwe has led to weak inter-agency co-ordination and co-operation.99 For 
example, in November 2016, the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe suspended the arrest of 
Jonathan Moyo who is the Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and 
Technology after ruling that the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission did not have the 
power to arrest him.100 This decision shows clearly that there was confusion regarding the 
powers of the Commission and there was no communication with other anti-corruption 
institutions such as the Prosecutor-General and the Zimbabwe Republic Police. Precise 
demarcation of power among anti-corruption institutions will result in effective 
investigation, prosecution and punishment of offenders. 
3.12 Protection of Whistleblowers 
Whistleblowers are important in the fight against corruption as they expose otherwise 
clandestine corrupt activities. Even more, they are important to assets declaration systems 
as they report suspicions of false declarations, undeclared assets and unexplained wealth 
held by public officers. Hence, Zimbabwe must ensure that whistleblowers are protected by 
the assets declaration laws in order to encourage revelations and disclosures by citizens. For 
example, the Malawian assets declaration legislation provides for the protection of 
whistleblowers who may decide to make anonymous reports.101 The legislation further 
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criminalises both the intimidation or victimisation of whistleblowers, and the disclosure of 
the identity of anonymous whistleblowers.102 
Whistleblowers may be gripped with fear or doubt if no investigations are carried 
out regarding their reports. The fear or doubt worsens if feedback is not given even upon 
request by the whistleblower. This undermines the confidence of the public in coming 
forward with information regarding any wrongdoing of which they are aware. Therefore, 
there needs to be an effective, user-friendly and responsive whistleblowing platform which 
enables people to report corruption with confidence and in the knowledge that action will 
be taken, that their safety will be guaranteed and that feedback will be given upon request. 
It is important to criminalise false whistleblowing aimed at ruining the reputation of 
the public officer or motivated by any other malicious purpose. Such criminalisation is 
meant to safeguard the whistleblowing platform against any form of abuse and to protect 
innocent public officers from vengeful adversaries. 
3.13 Financing of the Assets Declaration Regime 
Without adequate financial resources any assets declaration system functions poorly.103 A 
key consideration, then, is that financial resources be sufficient, stable and predictable so as 
to ensure the proper staffing and functioning of the system according to its mandate.104 It is 
important that the financial budget of the ADO be independent in order to ensure minimum 
political interference with its operations. 
3.14 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that, in the absence of international standards, it is a difficult task to 
design an effective assets declaration regime. Establishing such a regime is a big step 
towards curbing corruption and therefore the drafters need to formulate a legal framework 
which is practicable and enforceable. An overambitious assets declaration regime may 
suffer enforcement deficit and may become unpopular. The drafters of the regime should 
take into account Zimbabwe’s legal traditions and past experiences and also evaluate 
current issues in order to determine the legal approach which most likely will generate 
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support amongst politicians, public officers and the general public. It is of great importance 
to consider broader legal frameworks, such as tax law and criminal law, when designing the 
assets declaration system.105 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 Conclusion 
This research paper has discussed the need for an assets declaration regime in Zimbabwe as 
an anti-corruption tool. Corruption in Zimbabwe has become almost “normal”, with many 
public officers known for being corrupt and for possessing substantial unexplained wealth. 
According to Transparency International, Zimbabwe is perceived to be one of the most 
corrupt countries in Africa. The problem has been aggravated by the absence of an assets 
declaration regime in the country. 
Zimbabwe has ratified international legal instruments against corruption but has 
been reluctant to adopt the anti-corruption measures provided by these instruments. 
Treaties such as UNCAC and the AU Convention stipulate the need for public officers to 
declare their assets as a measure to curb corruption in the public sector. Section 189 of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe requires the enactment of national legislation regulating 
disclosure of assets by public officers and the establishment codes of conduct to be 
observed by public officers. The installation of an assets declaration regime in Zimbabwe is 
long overdue and should be addressed immediately as a measure to curb the corruption 
which has become endemic in the public sector. 
This research paper has highlighted the importance of a country having assets 
declaration laws. An assets declaration regime helps with the detection and prevention of 
conflicts of interests. The assets of public officers may be monitored easily to detect any 
unexplained wealth. An assets declaration regime promotes a culture of transparency and 
accountability in the public sector and helps to ensure that scarce resources will be used 
honestly and wisely for the betterment of the public. The knowledge that public officers are 
living within their means with nothing to hide and that their assets are being monitored 
effectively fosters public confidence in the government. Civil society, the media and anti-
corruption institutions in the country are empowered thereby, as the availability of 
information regarding the wealth of public officers helps them to detect and investigate 
corrupt activities. Assets declaration laws attract foreign direct investment and may be used 
to support other anti-corruption measures, such as asset recovery. 
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The findings of Mukherjee & Gokcekus show that an assets declaration regime can 
be a very powerful anti-corruption tool which may benefit Zimbabwe.1 These findings 
indicate that perceived levels of corruption are lower in countries with established assets 
declaration laws than in countries with recent assets declaration laws. They show also that 
perceived levels of corruption is low in countries which require verification of declarations 
and which provide criminal sanctions for non-compliance with declarations. 
The lack of political will is one of the main challenges to be faced in the 
establishment of an assets declaration regime. Lack of commitment from political leaders 
results invariably in an ineffective and porous regime which falls short on proper funding 
and effective enforcement. Therefore, it is imperative for political leaders to have strong 
political will to support the assets declaration regime and to provide it with adequate 
human and financial resources. There is a need for zero tolerance in the fight against 
corruption and any person in contravention of the assets declaration regime should be 
punished, regardless of political affiliation or governmental position. 
One of the thorny issues considered in this research paper is the conflict between 
right to privacy for public officers and the public interest in the disclosure of assets owned 
by public officers. Requiring public officers to complete assets declaration forms which are 
accessible to the public is a clear violation of their right to privacy. At the same time, there is 
immense public interest in combating corruption, with disclosure of assets being one of the 
many ways to do so. Therefore, there is an urgent imperative to find a proper balance 
between the right to privacy and the public interest in information contained in assets 
declarations. 
It was argued that Zimbabwe should require assets declarations from all senior 
public officers. Junior public officers who occupy positions vulnerable to corruption and the 
members of the judiciary should declare their assets as well. The declarants should be 
required to disclose other businesses and assets of a stipulated value, together with all 
liabilities. They should declare also the assets and liabilities of their spouses, dependent or 
single children and close family members. The declarations should be available to the public 
but with restricted access to liabilities and other private information of the public officers 
concerned. An independent assets declaration office (ADO) should be established which will 
                                                          
1 See §2.3 above. 
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be responsible solely for administration of declarations. Declarations should be subject to 
verification and non-compliant public officers must be sanctioned. 
Some assets declaration regimes have failed due to lack of clarity regarding the 
requirements for declarations. It is important that the law be clear on who is required to 
declare assets and to whom, what must be declared, what are the sanctions for non-
compliance and who is responsible for the punishment of non-compliant officers. 
4.2 Recommendations 
4.2.1 Start Slowly and Build Up Capacity 
After the enactment of an assets declaration regime in Zimbabwe, it is important for the 
responsible agency to start slowly and build up capacity. A common mistake is to establish 
the regime and soon thereafter to require thousands of civil servants to ﬁle a declaration 
form with the ADO within a short period. The ADO is unable effectively to handle and verify 
so many forms so early in its life. The assets declaration machinery should be given time to 
recruit and develop administrators with the expertise and experience to handle large 
volumes of declarations. 
No matter how many officeholders are covered by an assets declaration law, it 
should be introduced gradually in order to ensure that the proper administrative 
arrangements are in place to manage the required submissions.2 The verification procedures 
should be formulated and implemented after there is sufficient evidence that the 
submission mechanisms are working properly. The verification process should start with a 
fraction of the declarations being validated through a random or risk-based approach, until 
such time when there are enough resources and capacity to tackle all declarations. 
4.2.2 Training of Administrators and Declarants 
The success of an assets declaration regime depends largely on the effective handling and 
verification of declarations by administrators. It is important that the administrators are 
trained before taking office as well as during their terms in office. A major challenge in the 
early stages of the implementation of an assets declaration regime is making public officers 
aware of the new requirements and achieving respect for and compliance with the 
                                                          
2 Messick (2009) 11. 
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requirements.3 Training of declarants will raise awareness and provide guidance regarding 
the correct and truthful completion and filing of declaration forms, and any inquiries or 
objections which may be raised will be addressed. The training should cover the importance 
of an assets declaration regime and public officers should be made aware of their 
importance in the fight against corruption. 
4.2.3 Criminalise Illicit Enrichment 
With so many public officers possessing unexplained wealth in Zimbabwe, it is desirable to 
criminalise illicit enrichment. Illicit enrichment is criminalised by Article 20 of UNCAC and by 
Article 4(1)(g) of the AU Convention. Possession of unexplained wealth may be the only 
tangible evidence indicating that corruption has taken place and, therefore, criminalising 
illicit enrichment will allow Zimbabwe to prosecute corrupt public officers and confiscate 
the unexplained wealth on the basis that it is derived from illegal sources. With regard to 
the assets declaration regime, any unexplained increase in the declared assets may result in 
the declarants being prosecuted for illicit enrichment and in the unexplained wealth being 
confiscated by the state. Criminals hate losing money and pursuing the unexplained wealth 
in order to confiscate it will help in reducing corruption amongst public officers. 
4.2.4 Simplify the Declaration Process 
The declaration process should be made as simple and as clear as possible. A complicated 
declaration process will result in declarants having difficulties in completing and filing the 
prescribed forms. A simple declaration process is the one most likely to be appreciated and 
followed by the declarants. 
Electronic submission of declaration forms is desirable and may encourage 
compliance by declarants. The ADO will find it easier to handle electronic forms than paper 
forms, and the former may be stored in a database and can be retained for an indefinite 
period. 
4.2.5 Engage the Public and Promote Public Participation 
The government of Zimbabwe cannot fight corruption by itself. There is a need for 
assistance from and co-operation with non-state actors such as civil society organisations, 
                                                          
3 OECD (2011) 100. 
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the media, non-governmental organisations and the public in general. If the public is not 
engaged and there is little interest from non-state actors, the assets declaration regime will 
not be implemented effectively. 
Public sector corruption in Zimbabwe is recorded well by the media and by civil 
society. Public engagement promotes effective monitoring and oversight of the declaration 
regime. Non-state actors are important for verification of declaration forms and for the 
detection of unexplained wealth. For example, the media usually have information 
regarding the lifestyle of public officers which is important for verification of declarations. 
The government should engage the public in order to secure its co-operation for the proper 
implementation of the assets declaration regime. Engaging the public involves granting non-
state actors access to declared information for the effective monitoring of declarations. 
There should be a platform which allows non-state actors and the general public to 
approach the ADO with useful information regarding the assets of a public officer. 
An assets declaration regime can be a very powerful anti-corruption tool in 
Zimbabwe. However, the importance of political will for the success of the regime cannot be 
emphasised enough. There is a need for commitment from state and non-state actors to 
ensure that an assets declaration regime works, so that all corrupt public officers may be 
held accountable and that all illegally obtained assets may be forfeited. 
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